Maritime Security and Safety
Hormuz Toll Battle: Iran’s Transit Fee Gambit Threatens To Rewrite The Rules of Global Shipping
Hormuz Toll Battle: Iran’s Transit Fee Gambit Threatens To Rewrite The Rules of Global Shipping
As Tehran imposes informal charges of up to $2 million per voyage on select vessels and drafts legislation to formalise control of the world’s most critical oil corridor, the maritime order underpinning Nigeria’s crude exports and energy imports faces an existential stress test
By Ighoyota Onaibre | Waterways News, Lagos
What began as a wartime blockade has mutated into something potentially more enduring and more dangerous: an attempt to permanently redraw the legal and commercial architecture of international shipping at the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran, which has effectively shut down one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors since the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on its territory in late February 2026, is now demanding payment from commercial vessels seeking to pass through the narrow 34-kilometre waterway that connects the Arabian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. Payments of as much as $2 million per voyage are being sought on an ad hoc basis, effectively creating an informal toll on the waterway. Some vessels have reportedly complied, paying fees in Chinese currency or cryptocurrency before being escorted through the strait by Iranian naval vessels.
The stakes could hardly be higher. Until the US–Israeli war against Iran, roughly 25 percent of the world’s seaborne oil trade and 20 percent of its liquefied natural gas passed through the strait. Since the conflict erupted, ship tracking data shows traffic remains more than 90 percent below normal levels, with only select vessels — often after advance coordination and payment — permitted to pass.
The Legal Fault Line
At the heart of the dispute is a fundamental principle of international maritime law that has governed global trade for decades. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea guarantees vessels the right of “transit passage” through international straits — a right that cannot be suspended, obstructed, or priced. UNCLOS says states bordering straits cannot demand payment simply for permission to pass through. However, they can impose limited fees for specific services such as piloting, tugging, or port services.
The IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez has been unequivocal: “Countries do not have the right to introduce tools or payments or charges on these straits.” The global shipping regulator has called on the international community to reject Iran’s bid outright.
The legal distinction that makes this so consequential is the difference between a natural strait and a man-made canal. A canal is an artificial waterway built and maintained by a country; because canals require continuous investment, dredging, and operational management, states are allowed to charge tolls for their use. Natural straits, however, are treated as shared global corridors. The Suez Canal charges vessels billions in annual fees to fund Egypt’s infrastructure maintenance. The Strait of Hormuz, under established international law, is categorically different — it is nobody’s toll road.
Tehran, however, is pushing to change this. Iran is drafting legislation to impose transit fees, to be paid in Iranian rials, with a senior parliamentarian stating that once approved, the strait would come under “full control” of Iran’s armed forces. US President Donald Trump warned Tehran in blunt terms against the move, while the International Chamber of Shipping and tanker owners’ group Intertanko have urged members not to pay, arguing the practice violates long-standing maritime custom.
Selective Passage and the IRGC Toll Booth
What is emerging in the strait is not a conventional blockade but something more politically calculated. Iran has demanded international recognition of its right to exercise authority over the Strait of Hormuz as one of its five conditions for ending the war. In the interim, it has operated what analysts are describing as a geopolitical screening system. On 26 March, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that ships owned by five nations — China, Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan — would be allowed to transit the strait. (Wikipedia) Malaysian and Thai vessels later gained access following diplomatic talks.
At least two vessels that have transited the strait so far paid fees in yuan, with one transit brokered by a Chinese maritime services company acting as intermediary. Nearly 2,000 vessels remain stranded on both sides of the strait, while the IMO’s Dominguez has warned that some 20,000 seafarers remain stranded in the Gulf due to the effective blockade, with the situation growing more detrimental the longer it persists.
A fragile ceasefire announced in early April has done little to restore normal traffic. Only 22 ships with their automatic identification systems switched on exited the strait between the start of the truce and the following Friday, compared with approximately 135 daily transits before the war.
The Precedent That Terrifies Shipping Markets
Beyond the immediate disruption lies a question that maritime lawyers and trade economists regard as potentially generational in its consequences. If countries were allowed to charge tolls in natural straits, it could set a precedent for others to follow. Strategic chokepoints could become tools of economic and political pressure, increasing shipping costs and disrupting supply chains. Oil prices have already risen by around 50 percent due to the conflict, with analysts raising their forecast for Brent crude to $82.85 per barrel — up roughly 30 percent on earlier projections. The International Energy Agency estimated that the conflict reduced global crude oil supplies by around 11 million barrels per day through the end of March.
Major powers remain cautious about further escalation, acutely aware of the risks of military confrontation in a narrow and heavily trafficked corridor. The US military has said it sailed two warships through the strait in an effort to clear the waterway of Iranian mines, an announcement Iran denied.
Meanwhile, China — the largest importer of energy routed through Hormuz — has refrained from confrontation, preferring to use its diplomatic leverage with Tehran to secure passage for its own vessels.
As tensions persist, the Strait of Hormuz continues to test the balance between national interest and international law, with potentially far-reaching consequences for global trade and energy security.
Nigeria Watch
Why Abuja cannot afford to treat this as a distant crisis
For Nigeria, the Hormuz crisis is not a spectator sport. As Africa’s largest oil producer and a nation whose import bill — from refined petroleum to fertilisers — is denominated overwhelmingly in dollar freight costs shaped by global energy prices, the protracted closure of the world’s most critical oil corridor lands directly on the desks of policymakers in Abuja and operators at Apapa.
On the export side, Nigeria’s crude competes in a market where Asian buyers — who absorb the bulk of Gulf oil — are now scrambling to reconfigure supply chains. That scramble has kept Brent elevated, a short-term windfall for Nigeria’s federation account. But the Dangote Refinery’s ambitions to position Nigeria as a petroleum export hub for Africa depend on competitively priced crude feedstock and stable freight routes; sustained market volatility complicates that calculus.
On the import side, the shock is more acute. Nigeria still imports the majority of its cooking gas and industrial chemicals, significant volumes of which move through supply chains directly disrupted by the Hormuz closure. Fertiliser supply chains — of which up to 30 percent of internationally traded volumes normally transit the Strait of Hormuz (Wikipedia) — are already under strain, with downstream consequences for Nigeria’s agricultural input costs.
For NIMASA and the Federal Ministry of Marine and Blue Economy, the legal dimensions of the crisis deserve close study. If Iran succeeds in normalising transit fees on a natural international strait — even under the pressure of a peace deal brokered between Washington and Tehran — the precedent will not be lost on other coastal states bordering strategic waterways. Nigeria’s own positioning in the Gulf of Guinea, and its advocacy for regional maritime sovereignty within IMO frameworks, will eventually require a clear Nigerian position on whether geography confers the right to monetise global shipping corridors. The time to begin formulating that position is now.
FIVE DEAD, 41 MISSING AS FIRE GUTS INDONESIAN FERRY CARRYING 271
By Raymond Gold | Waterways News
At least five people are dead and 41 others remain missing after a passenger ferry caught fire off Indonesia’s Madura Island on Sunday, triggering a major multi-agency search and rescue operation involving naval and civilian vessels.
The Mutiara Sentosa 2, sailing the roughly 40-hour Surabaya to Makassar route with 271 people on board, including 232 passengers and 39 crew members, caught fire between 6 a.m. and 7 a.m. local time in waters off Sumenep regency, Indonesia’s National Search and Rescue Agency said. The vessel was also reportedly carrying 181 vehicles, mostly trucks, and an excavator.
About an hour after the blaze started, ferry operator PT Atosim Lampung Pelayaran alerted the Surabaya Search and Rescue Office, after the vessel’s captain radioed a distress report saying the ship was ablaze near the northern tip of Madura Island. Contact with the vessel was then lost.
By 9:45 a.m., rescuers had pinpointed the ferry’s location, roughly 19 nautical miles north of Buruan Sapudi Island, after reaching the nearby cargo ship Meratus Project 3. That vessel, however, could not approach the burning ferry closely because it was carrying a flammable load. A tugboat and another passing vessel became the first responders, beginning evacuations shortly before 10 a.m., before more ships joined the operation.
By Sunday afternoon, several nearby vessels had rescued 225 passengers and crew and recovered five bodies, with 41 people still unaccounted for. Basarnas dispatched a rescue vessel from Surabaya, though officials estimated a six-hour transit time to the scene, and a rigid inflatable boat sent from the Sumenep rescue post was forced to turn back due to rough seas and high waves. An Indonesian naval warship has since joined the search.
The cause of the fire has not been established and remains under investigation. It is the second major Indonesian maritime distress incident in as many months. Last month, rescuers searched for survivors after the KM Nurul Salsa suffered engine failure and sank, with five survivors, including a seven-year-old girl, recovered days later.
NIGERIA WATCH
Indonesia’s tragedy off Madura should sound familiar to anyone tracking Nigeria’s own inland and coastal waterways. Strip away the geography and the pattern is the same one that recurs on the Niger, the Benue and the Niger Delta creeks every rainy season. Overloaded or ill-equipped vessels, delayed distress reporting, and rescue assets that arrive too late or cannot reach the casualty at all.
The detail that should trouble Nigerian regulators most is the nearby cargo ship that could not assist the burning ferry because it was itself carrying flammable cargo. This is a reminder that firefighting capability, not just headcount, is the real test of vessel safety. NIMASA and NIWA have made real strides on the Seafarer Discharge Book digitization and the CVFF portal, but neither agency has articulated a clear standard for onboard fire-suppression systems on domestic ferries, particularly those plying the country’s inland waterways that operators like WABOTAN and ATBOWATON know well.
There is also a lesson for NIWA and LASWA in the response timeline. Indonesian rescuers, despite dispatching a navy warship and multiple agency assets, still needed roughly six hours to reach the vessel, and one rescue boat had to turn back in rough seas. Nigeria’s own record on Benue and Niger Delta boat accidents shows the same gap between a distress call and an effective response, a gap that NIWA’s enforcement push and the LASWA-Interferry Ferry Safety Development Programme are meant to close, but which will keep costing lives until vessel-side fire and lifesaving equipment compliance is treated with the same urgency as overloading and life-jacket enforcement.
Maritime Security and Safety
HORMUZ SHADOW FLEET: HOW A WAR-ZONE WORKAROUND IS QUIETLY KEEPING THE WORLD’S OIL MARKET ALIVE
HORMUZ SHADOW FLEET: HOW A WAR-ZONE WORKAROUND IS QUIETLY KEEPING THE WORLD’S OIL MARKET ALIVE
By Oghenewoke Osaweren | Waterways News
Beneath the surface calm of a fragile Middle East ceasefire, a covert maritime operation is doing what diplomacy has not been able to do. It is keeping oil flowing out of the world’s most contested waterway. Tankers with their transponders deliberately switched off are meeting far offshore, transferring millions of barrels ship-to-ship, and disappearing back into commercial shipping lanes before regulators, insurers, or belligerents can react.
This is not a new tactic. It is the same “dark fleet” playbook sanctioned Iranian, Russian, and Venezuelan crude have relied on for years. What has changed is who is now using it, and why a legitimate, US-escorted oil trade has been forced to borrow the tradecraft of sanctions evasion just to survive.
THE NUMBERS TELL A STORY OF FRAGILE NORMALITY
Satellite imagery over the Omani port of Sohar recorded at least seven tanker-pair transfers in a single day this week, several involving supertanker-class vessels capable of moving a combined 8 million barrels. Two weeks earlier, at the height of renewed US-Iran hostilities, that same stretch of water saw only two such transfers. The swing illustrates how tightly oil-market stability in 2026 is now tethered not to production levels, but to a handful of shipowners’ daily risk calculus.
Even with the rebound, flows remain a fraction of the roughly 20 million barrels a day that once transited the Strait of Hormuz before the war. US officials now put total Gulf exit volumes at around 13 million barrels daily, split roughly evenly between the strait itself and bypass pipelines built precisely to reduce dependence on Hormuz. American forces say they have personally escorted close to 500 million barrels out of the strait since May, a scale of military involvement in commercial shipping rarely seen outside declared war.
WHAT THIS MEANS BEYOND THE GULF
For Nigeria and other non-Gulf producers, a Hormuz shuttle trade that works, however imperfectly, is a double-edged development. It has so far kept a full-blown price shock at bay, with Brent oscillating between $80 and $100 rather than spiking uncontrollably, which shields Nigeria’s import-heavy fuel supply chain and naira-denominated energy costs from the worst-case scenario. But it also means Gulf producers are adapting fast enough to defend their market share even under bombardment, a resilience that could blunt any window Nigerian and West African crude grades might otherwise have gained as buyers hedged away from Hormuz-dependent barrels.
There is also a governance dimension worth flagging for Nigerian maritime observers. The same AIS-dark, ship-to-ship transfer tactics now legitimising emergency oil flows out of the Gulf are structurally identical to the techniques long used for illegal bunkering and crude theft in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea. When a G7 navy escorts and effectively normalises transponder-dark transfers as sound commercial practice under conflict conditions, it complicates the international case for treating the same behaviour as inherently criminal in West African waters, an inconsistency Nigerian regulators and NIMASA may eventually have to reckon with.
A MARKET RUNNING ON DELAYED CARGOES, NOT CONFIDENCE
Perhaps the clearest sign of how strained the system remains: buyers of Emirati crude, including cargoes tied to ADNOC tenders, are only now receiving shipments that were due weeks ago, some having incurred demurrage costs on ships hired to collect oil that never showed up on schedule. ADNOC’s shipping unit has itself had to book a tanker for a Sohar ship-to-ship pickup, effectively routing its own state oil company’s cargo through the same shadow logistics used to dodge attacks.
The picture that emerges is not one of a market that has stabilised, but of a market that has adapted to instability, one satellite pass at a time.
Maritime Security and Safety
Search Continues for 17 Missing as Vietnamese Cargo Vessel Sinks in South China Sea
Search Continues for 17 Missing as Vietnamese Cargo Vessel Sinks in South China Sea
Rescuers are still combing waters near a contested reef system in the South China Sea after a Vietnamese-flagged cargo vessel went down over the weekend, leaving 17 crew members unaccounted for.
Of the 62 people who were aboard the vessel, the Khoi Nguyen 18, when it ran into difficulty, 45 have so far been pulled to safety, Vietnamese officials confirmed.
According to Chinese state media, the roughly 70-metre freighter got into trouble close to Yongshu Reef, also called Fiery Cross Reef, off China’s Hainan province. A Chinese rescue vessel, the Nanhai Jiu 115, first picked up what appeared to be a distress flare from the stricken ship on Saturday evening, shortly before 6:30pm local time.
The search-and-rescue effort has drawn in a sizeable multinational response: six Chinese vessels, a rescue helicopter, and a Vietnamese ship have all joined the operation, state news agency Xinhua reported.
A flashpoint waterway
The sinking adds to safety concerns in one of the world’s most disputed maritime zones. China claims sovereignty over the vast majority of the South China Sea — a position an international tribunal rejected in a landmark 2016 ruling brought by the Philippines.
Among the most contentious areas are the Spratly Islands (known in China as the Nansha Islands), where Beijing has built airstrips and fortified artificial islands. China’s claims overlap with those of Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan, making the region a persistent source of regional friction and, as this incident shows, a challenging one for maritime emergency response.
Search efforts were ongoing at the time of filing.
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