NCS Revenue Surge Raises Hard Questions on Trade, Ports, and the Real State of Nigeria’s Economy

28 April 2026 | Waterways News

As Customs collections hit ₦7.28 trillion in 2025, maritime stakeholders and port operators ask: who is this growth working for?

The Numbers Tell One Story. The Ports Tell Another.

The Nigeria Customs Service has recorded a remarkable revenue trajectory over the past five years — from ₦1.562 trillion in 2020 to ₦2.24 trillion in 2021, ₦2.60 trillion in 2022, ₦3.21 trillion in 2023, ₦6.1 trillion in 2024, and a historic ₦7.28 trillion in the 2025 fiscal year.

For an agency that passes enormous volumes of cargo through Nigeria’s seaports — Apapa, Tin Can Island, Onne, Lekki, and beyond — these figures represent a significant institutional achievement. But they also raise uncomfortable questions that the maritime industry cannot afford to ignore.

Nigeria’s ports are the primary gateway through which the bulk of this revenue is generated. Yet the broader economic context in which they operate — rising inflation, declining consumer purchasing power, factory closures, and stubbornly high unemployment — sits in sharp and troubling contrast to the customs revenue boom. Port-side operators, freight forwarders, and cargo owners continue to report shrinking cargo volumes and tightening margins. If trade is booming enough to generate ₦7.28 trillion, the question industry must ask is: what exactly is being traded, and who bears the cost?

What Is Driving the Revenue Growth?
Several plausible factors are in circulation among port stakeholders. The increasing use of Nigeria’s deep-water terminals by neighbouring landlocked countries — as transit hubs — may be contributing to throughput volumes. Elevated import values driven by naira depreciation naturally inflate duty assessments even where actual cargo volumes are flat or declining. Improved compliance enforcement and the deployment of technology under the leadership of Comptroller-General Dr. Wale Adeniyi may also be playing a role.
The NCS itself has been emphatic that modernisation and automation are central to its revenue performance. For port users and trade facilitators, however, the concern is whether this modernisation is translating into faster cargo clearance, reduced dwell times, and a more competitive port environment — or simply higher collections at the same inefficient pace.

Port Modernisation: Sustained Momentum or Another False Dawn?
Nigeria’s seaport sector has seen its share of well-announced reforms that stalled or reversed. The current wave of trade facilitation measures — the Nigeria National Single Window, the ICTN cargo tracking scheme, and broader port concession renewal processes — must not suffer the same fate.
Maritime stakeholders have a direct stake in ensuring that port modernisation programmes are not merely collection-optimisation exercises for government revenue but genuine improvements in the ease of doing business at Nigerian ports. Reduced cargo dwell times, elimination of multiple documentation bottlenecks, and clear interagency coordination between Customs, the Nigerian Ports Authority, NIMASA, and the Nigerian Shippers’ Council are the benchmarks against which reform must be measured.
There is also the question of interagency alignment. Customs modernisation, however well-funded, cannot function at peak effectiveness in an environment where other agencies at the ports operate on different — and sometimes conflicting — technological and operational platforms. The call for harmonisation is not new, but it remains unheeded at considerable cost to port efficiency.

Anti-Smuggling: Warehouses Bursting, Disposal Lagging
The NCS’s anti-smuggling operations have yielded substantial seizures across all its zones — covering narcotics, foodstuffs, machinery, drones, and contraband clothing and footwear. The Duty Paid Value of these seizures has grown in parallel with revenue figures.
But a problem persists that directly concerns port and logistics operators: the timely disposal of seized goods. Customs warehouses and holding facilities are reportedly overwhelmed, with perishable and time-sensitive items deteriorating while awaiting resolution. In a country where poverty and food insecurity are daily realities, the spectacle of seized rice and foodstuffs rotting in government custody is both a logistical failure and a moral indictment. Faster, more transparent disposal mechanisms — including structured auctions and regulated redistribution frameworks — must be prioritised.

Security Collaboration: The Port Dimension
On maritime and border security, the NCS has strengthened its collaborative frameworks with both domestic agencies and international partners. At a recent international Customs conference, CG Adeniyi stated that crime has evolved beyond borders and that coordinated global action is now a necessity rather than an option.

For the port and maritime sector, this translates directly to the effectiveness of joint operations between Customs, the Nigerian Navy, NIMASA’s Deep Blue Project assets, and port security authorities in combating container fraud, arms trafficking, and narcotics transit through Nigeria’s terminals. The gains recorded in this space deserve acknowledgment, even as gaps in inland container depot oversight and the informal coastal trade corridor continue to attract scrutiny.

CSR: Customs Cares — But What About the Port Community?
The NCS under Dr. Adeniyi has expanded its Corporate Social Responsibility footprint, extending support to institutions across the country. This is commendable. The maritime community, however, has a specific expectation: that CSR initiatives extend meaningfully to port-host communities — the residents of Apapa, Tin Can, Onne, and Warri — whose daily lives are most directly disrupted by port operations and whose infrastructure needs are most acute.
Port-adjacent community investment by the NCS, in partnership with the NPA and terminal operators, would represent a more targeted and impactful use of goodwill resources than broad national CSR campaigns.

Nigeria Watch
The NCS revenue story is ultimately a mirror held up to Nigeria’s broader economic contradictions. For maritime and port stakeholders, the headline numbers matter less than the structural questions underneath them: Is port trade actually growing, or are inflated naira values masking volume stagnation? Is modernisation accelerating cargo clearance, or simply digitising existing bottlenecks? And critically — is the revenue generated at Nigeria’s ports being recycled into the port infrastructure, security architecture, and community development frameworks that would make those ports more competitive, not just more extractive?

The Federal Ministry of Marine and Blue Economy, the NPA, and the NCS must align on a shared port productivity agenda that treats revenue performance and operational efficiency as inseparable goals. Trillion-naira collections mean little if Nigeria’s ports continue to lose cargo to Cotonou, Lomé, and Tema.

Waterways News | Maritime | Ports | Shipping | Blue Economy

Omi-Eko’s Missing Partner: Why Lagos Must Put the Boat Workers’ Union at the Heart of Its Ferry Revolution

MWUN’s Lagos Commercial Private Boat District has been calling for the same reforms Omi-Eko promises — it’s time Lagos State listened

By Oghenewoke Onoriode | Waterways News Correspondent, Lagos

Lagos was built on water. Long before the expressways and the gridlock that define daily life in Africa’s most populous city, its people moved by boat. Canoes carried commerce. Lagoons linked communities. The water was the highway. Now, with roads choked beyond capacity and millions of commuters losing hours daily to traffic, Lagos is attempting to return to that founding logic — through the most ambitious inland waterways investment ever conceived on the African continent.
The vehicle for that return is the Omi-Eko Project, and its scale is extraordinary.

Backed by the French Development Agency (AFD) with a €130 million loan, the European Investment Bank (EIB) with €170 million, and the European Union with a €60 million grant, the project will introduce 15 structured ferry routes spanning 140 kilometres, connect 25 upgraded ferry terminals, and deploy 75 state-of-the-art electric ferries capable of carrying hundreds of passengers each.
But the architects of this project must confront one critical reality plainly: the waterways workforce they seek to transform already has a union — and that union must become a central partner in delivering the Omi-Eko vision, not an afterthought in its rollout.

The Union That Has Always Been There
The Lagos Commercial Private Boat District of the Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria (MWUN) is the organised representative voice of commercial boat operators on Lagos waterways. The MWUN, Nigeria’s apex trade union in the maritime sector and an affiliate of the Nigeria Labour Congress, represents sailors, dockworkers, and workers across related trades nationwide.
This is not an informal grouping of pier workers. It is a structured, constitutionally recognised labour body with elected leadership and a documented history of engaging government agencies and regulators. Notably, the MWUN has signed Memoranda of Understanding with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), deploying its vessels and personnel for the distribution of sensitive electoral materials across Nigeria’s riverine states — a measure of the institutional credibility and operational trust it has earned at national level.

The question, therefore, is not whether the union exists. It does. The question is whether Lagos State is prepared to sit across the table from it as a genuine partner in one of the most consequential urban transport transformations on the continent.

What the Union Has Been Saying for Years
Long before the Omi-Eko Project was conceived, MWUN through the Lagos Commercial Private Boat District was already raising the very issues the project claims to address. The District formally identified its members’ core operational challenges as: the absence of a safe working environment; submerged wreckages obstructing waterways; poor navigational buoy lighting for night voyages; harassment of operators by security agents; the lack of boat fuel refilling stations along Lagos waterways; inadequate training and retraining opportunities; and the inability of operators to access modern vessels.

Read that list carefully. Every item on it is something the Omi-Eko Project, in one form or another, proposes to fix — cleaner terminals, modern electric ferries, structured routes, safety infrastructure, and a formalised operating environment. The union was not waiting to be told what the problems were. It was waiting to be taken seriously when it named them.

The MWUN has consistently called on government to empower relevant agencies with the legal tools to regulate private boat operators and streamline their operations. That language aligns directly with what Omi-Eko aspires to achieve. The union is not resistant to modernisation. It has been demanding it.

Why the Union Is the Key to Formalisation
Lagos State has argued that water transport formalisation requires cooperative structures among operators. That is a reasonable administrative preference — but it overlooks the fact that the Maritime Workers Union, through the Lagos Commercial Private Boat District already offers something more robust than a cooperative: full trade union representation under Nigeria’s Labour Act, complete with grievance mechanisms, collective bargaining frameworks, and worker protections that cooperatives alone cannot provide.

The current MWUN President General, Comrade Francis Bunu, has raised concerns about unseaworthy vessels on Nigeria’s inland waterways and called for stricter regulatory oversight across the maritime industry. That is precisely the kind of institutional voice that should be at the governance table when LASWA, the Ministry of Transportation, and Omi-Eko project developers are designing the new ferry system’s operational framework. A union leadership that itself calls for safety standards and vessel regulation is a natural ally — not an obstacle.

Comrade Bunu has further stated that improving worker welfare, ensuring direct union-management engagement, and guaranteeing compensation for accident victims are central priorities of his administration. These are the social protections that any responsible infrastructure project must embed from the outset.

A Complex Regulatory Landscape — and Why Labour Unity Matters
The Omi-Eko Project does not operate in a simple regulatory environment. In January 2024, the Supreme Court resolved a long-running jurisdictional dispute between the National Inland Waterways Authority (NIWA) and the Lagos State Waterways Authority (LASWA), holding that the NIWA Act, as federal legislation, prevails over the Lagos State Waterways Authority Law of 2008 and that applying both simultaneously constitutes multiple levies on operators.

This ruling has significant consequences for Omi-Eko. It means the project’s operational and regulatory framework must be carefully built at the intersection of federal and state authority — precisely the kind of complex environment where an organised, legally recognised labour body becomes indispensable. The Lagos Commercial Private Boat District, operating under MWUN’s national umbrella, is uniquely positioned to navigate both federal and state dimensions on behalf of workers.
Without the union’s active participation, workers risk being caught in the crossfire of jurisdictional ambiguity — their livelihoods subject to regulatory shifts that are neither fully coordinated nor fully protective.

What a Genuine Partnership Must Look Like
Engaging the Maritime Workers Union is not a gesture of goodwill. It is a structural necessity. A credible partnership must include:
A formal governance seat. The union must be represented in Omi-Eko’s oversight committees as a voting stakeholder — not a passive observer. LASWA, the Ministry of Transportation, and the European partners who have committed over €400 million must insist on this.

A jointly negotiated transition framework: The shift from informal wooden boats to electric ferries will displace existing operators unless there is a planned, negotiated pathway. The union is the correct body to co-design redeployment plans, redundancy terms where unavoidable, and retraining curricula for members.

Skills development and certification routed through the union: The Omi-Eko technology transfer component should channel certification and training through the District structure — ensuring that qualifications reach frontline workers, not just regulatory agencies.

Binding wage and safety standards in concession agreements: When private operators are awarded concessions on Omi-Eko routes, those agreements must include enforceable wage floors and occupational health and safety standards. The MWUN has demonstrated it can hold employers accountable. It should be empowered to do so in the new system.

A formal end to operator harassment: The District has formally documented security agent harassment of commercial boat operators as a longstanding operational burden. As Omi-Eko terminals open and routes formalise, LASWA must issue clear, enforceable directives protecting unionised operators from extortion and arbitrary interference.

The Lesson From the Road
When BRT buses arrived in Lagos, the transition was turbulent. Danfo operators resisted, motor park unions clashed with the new order, and routes were disrupted. The accommodation that eventually emerged came not from ignoring labour, but from engaging it — imperfectly and belatedly, but eventually.
The waterways are different. They are unforgiving in ways roads are not. A workforce that is resentful, bypassed, or economically threatened is a safety risk on a lagoon in a way it simply is not on a bus route. The Maritime Workers Union understands this. It has long argued that improving safety on the waterways requires empowering workers and streamlining operations — not displacing the people who have kept Lagos moving by water for generations.

Conclusion: The Union Is Omi-Eko’s Best Asset
The ferries will come. The terminals will rise. The routes will open. But the true measure of the Omi-Eko Project’s success will not be found in the solar panels on electric hulls or the architectural elegance of new jetties. It will be found in whether the boat operator from Badore, the engine room hand at Ijora, the loading attendant at Kirikiri — men and women who have kept Lagos moving by water for generations — find a dignified, secure, and fairly remunerated place in the new system.

The LCPBD of the Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria is not a problem to be managed. It is the institutional answer to Lagos State’s own stated goal of formalising waterway transportation. The union has the membership, the mandate, and the structural legitimacy to be Omi-Eko’s most important labour partner.

Lagos State must now act on that reality. The union is already there. The project is here. It is time for them to meet — formally, seriously, and on equal terms.

Nigeria Watch
The Omi-Eko Project represents a defining inflection point not just for Lagos, but for Nigeria’s broader Blue Economy aspirations. With over €400 million in European financing committed and Africa’s largest inland waterways investment now in motion, the stakes extend well beyond one city’s commuter problem.

What Lagos gets right — or wrong — on labour integration will set a template replicated across other Nigerian waterway cities: Port Harcourt, Warri, Calabar, Onitsha. If the MWUN’s Lagos District is sidelined in Omi-Eko’s design, the resulting friction — strikes, route disruptions, operator resistance — could erode investor confidence in waterways infrastructure nationally, at precisely the moment Nigeria needs that confidence most.

The Federal Ministry of Marine and Blue Economy and NIWA should be watching this closely. Their own inland waterways mandate, and the federal regulatory architecture upheld by the 2024 Supreme Court ruling, gives them both the authority and the obligation to ensure that organised maritime labour is embedded — not excluded — from the infrastructure reforms now unfolding in Lagos. The Omi-Eko Project is too important to get this wrong.

Editorial Analysis | Waterways News | waterwaysnews.ng

150 Bandits, One Capsized Boat, Zero Evidence: Inside Nigeria’s Latest Viral Security Lie

Multiple official bodies deny the report as Sokoto’s rivers run dry this season

By Oghenewoke Osaweren Waterwaysnews.ng | March 23, 2026

A viral report claiming that over 150 suspected armed bandits perished in a boat mishap along a waterway in Sokoto State has been dismissed as false by the National Inland Waterways Authority (NIWA), the Nigerian Army, and the Sokoto State Police Command — raising serious questions about the origin and intent of the widely-circulated story.

How the Story Broke

The report first gained traction through a post by Zagazola Makama, a counter-insurgency and security analyst focused on the Lake Chad region, who cited local sources claiming the incident occurred on the evening of Saturday, March 21, 2026. According to those sources, a vessel carrying a large number of armed men capsized while crossing a water body in the Sabon Gida area of Sabon Birni Local Government Area, Sokoto State.

The vessel was reportedly overloaded with armed men, and preliminary findings cited by Makama suggested that many of those on board could not swim, resulting in what sources described as heavy casualties, with early reports indicating that none of the occupants survived. The story spread rapidly across Nigerian media platforms on Sunday, with headlines referring to the dead as “bandits” or “Boko Haram fighters” — the latter label being factually imprecise given that the incident was reportedly located in Sokoto’s North-West banditry corridor, not the North-East where Boko Haram primarily operates.

Crucially, there was no official confirmation from any security agency at the time the initial report was filed.

NIWA: “The River Is Not Navigable”

The most authoritative rebuttal came from the agency statutorily responsible for Nigeria’s inland waterways. NIWA Area Manager for the Sokoto Zonal Office, Mr. Bello Bala, flatly dismissed the report as fake in an interview with the News Agency of Nigeria on Monday, stating that no such incident occurred and that the river mentioned in the reports is not navigable.

This is a significant technical point. From a waterways management standpoint, a river that is not navigable cannot sustain the kind of large-scale boat crossing described in the viral reports. Bala further noted that NIWA maintains active community-level engagement in riverine areas, and that any genuine water-related casualty of that magnitude would have been reported through established channels. He stressed that community members would have reported such an event to water users’ association leaders — a grassroots early-warning mechanism NIWA relies on across its operational zones.

Police: “It Only Existed in the Imagination of Fabricators”

The Sokoto State Police Command went further in its denial. The Command’s Public Relations Officer, DSP Ahmed Rufa’i, said the report was completely false, adding that it had “no iota of truth.” He explained that rivers in Sokoto’s eastern axis — where Sabon Birni is located — are largely not navigable during the dry season, only becoming so during the rainy season. His statement provides an important seasonal context: March falls squarely within Nigeria’s dry season, when water levels in North-West rivers drop dramatically, making large-boat crossings physically implausible.

Nigerian Army: Troops Were on Ground, No Incident Reported

A source within the Nigerian Army’s 8 Division in Sokoto, speaking on condition of anonymity, also confirmed that the report was false, stating that troops deployed across the area recorded no boat-capsize incident involving armed groups. The military’s presence in the area is part of ongoing counterbanditry operations across Sokoto and Zamfara states.

In a separate but related development, the 8 Division Strike Force launched a verified operation targeting the camp of notorious bandit leader Bello Turji in Kagara Forest, spanning Shinkafi and Isa local government areas of Zamfara and Sokoto states. That operation — a confirmed, active military engagement — stands in stark contrast to the unverified boat-capsize claim, and underscores that credible security reporting from the region is entirely possible when sourced properly.

What the Evidence Suggests

The viral story presents several verifiability problems. The original report was attributed entirely to anonymous local sources relayed through a single analyst’s social media post, with no eyewitness footage, no recovered bodies, no community confirmation, and no corroboration from any of the security agencies that maintain active operational presence in the area. Every official body with jurisdiction over the location — NIWA, the Nigerian Police, and the Nigerian Army — has independently denied the incident.

The mislabelling of North-West bandits as “Boko Haram” in some versions of the story also points to a troubling lack of editorial rigour. Boko Haram and its offshoots operate primarily in the North-East — Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa — not in Sokoto’s banditry-afflicted local government areas. Conflating the two distinct insurgencies does a disservice to public understanding of Nigeria’s complex security landscape.

A Word on Responsible Waterways Reporting

For a publication focused on Nigeria’s inland waterways sector, this story carries an important lesson. NIWA’s Bala appealed to media organisations to always verify reports with credible sources before publication, reaffirming that the authority remains available to provide technical clarification on waterway-related incidents. His call is particularly apt here: the specific claim that a mass-casualty boat event occurred on a non-navigable stretch of river is precisely the kind of detail that waterways-focused editorial teams are best positioned to scrutinise and challenge.

Verdict

Based on available evidence as of Monday, March 23, 2026, the claim that over 150 bandits drowned in a boat mishap at Sabon Gida, Sabon Birni Local Government Area, Sokoto State remains “unverified and officially denied” by NIWA, the Sokoto State Police Command, and the Nigerian Army. The geographical, seasonal, and logistical basis of the original claim does not withstand scrutiny. Waterwaysnews.ng urges readers and fellow media outlets to await verified, official accounts before amplifying security-related waterway reports.

Waterwaysnews.ng Editorial Desk