Maritime Security and Safety
Hormuz Toll Battle: Iran’s Transit Fee Gambit Threatens To Rewrite The Rules of Global Shipping
Hormuz Toll Battle: Iran’s Transit Fee Gambit Threatens To Rewrite The Rules of Global Shipping
As Tehran imposes informal charges of up to $2 million per voyage on select vessels and drafts legislation to formalise control of the world’s most critical oil corridor, the maritime order underpinning Nigeria’s crude exports and energy imports faces an existential stress test
By Ighoyota Onaibre | Waterways News, Lagos
What began as a wartime blockade has mutated into something potentially more enduring and more dangerous: an attempt to permanently redraw the legal and commercial architecture of international shipping at the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran, which has effectively shut down one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors since the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on its territory in late February 2026, is now demanding payment from commercial vessels seeking to pass through the narrow 34-kilometre waterway that connects the Arabian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. Payments of as much as $2 million per voyage are being sought on an ad hoc basis, effectively creating an informal toll on the waterway. Some vessels have reportedly complied, paying fees in Chinese currency or cryptocurrency before being escorted through the strait by Iranian naval vessels.
The stakes could hardly be higher. Until the US–Israeli war against Iran, roughly 25 percent of the world’s seaborne oil trade and 20 percent of its liquefied natural gas passed through the strait. Since the conflict erupted, ship tracking data shows traffic remains more than 90 percent below normal levels, with only select vessels — often after advance coordination and payment — permitted to pass.
The Legal Fault Line
At the heart of the dispute is a fundamental principle of international maritime law that has governed global trade for decades. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea guarantees vessels the right of “transit passage” through international straits — a right that cannot be suspended, obstructed, or priced. UNCLOS says states bordering straits cannot demand payment simply for permission to pass through. However, they can impose limited fees for specific services such as piloting, tugging, or port services.
The IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez has been unequivocal: “Countries do not have the right to introduce tools or payments or charges on these straits.” The global shipping regulator has called on the international community to reject Iran’s bid outright.
The legal distinction that makes this so consequential is the difference between a natural strait and a man-made canal. A canal is an artificial waterway built and maintained by a country; because canals require continuous investment, dredging, and operational management, states are allowed to charge tolls for their use. Natural straits, however, are treated as shared global corridors. The Suez Canal charges vessels billions in annual fees to fund Egypt’s infrastructure maintenance. The Strait of Hormuz, under established international law, is categorically different — it is nobody’s toll road.
Tehran, however, is pushing to change this. Iran is drafting legislation to impose transit fees, to be paid in Iranian rials, with a senior parliamentarian stating that once approved, the strait would come under “full control” of Iran’s armed forces. US President Donald Trump warned Tehran in blunt terms against the move, while the International Chamber of Shipping and tanker owners’ group Intertanko have urged members not to pay, arguing the practice violates long-standing maritime custom.
Selective Passage and the IRGC Toll Booth
What is emerging in the strait is not a conventional blockade but something more politically calculated. Iran has demanded international recognition of its right to exercise authority over the Strait of Hormuz as one of its five conditions for ending the war. In the interim, it has operated what analysts are describing as a geopolitical screening system. On 26 March, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that ships owned by five nations — China, Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan — would be allowed to transit the strait. (Wikipedia) Malaysian and Thai vessels later gained access following diplomatic talks.
At least two vessels that have transited the strait so far paid fees in yuan, with one transit brokered by a Chinese maritime services company acting as intermediary. Nearly 2,000 vessels remain stranded on both sides of the strait, while the IMO’s Dominguez has warned that some 20,000 seafarers remain stranded in the Gulf due to the effective blockade, with the situation growing more detrimental the longer it persists.
A fragile ceasefire announced in early April has done little to restore normal traffic. Only 22 ships with their automatic identification systems switched on exited the strait between the start of the truce and the following Friday, compared with approximately 135 daily transits before the war.
The Precedent That Terrifies Shipping Markets
Beyond the immediate disruption lies a question that maritime lawyers and trade economists regard as potentially generational in its consequences. If countries were allowed to charge tolls in natural straits, it could set a precedent for others to follow. Strategic chokepoints could become tools of economic and political pressure, increasing shipping costs and disrupting supply chains. Oil prices have already risen by around 50 percent due to the conflict, with analysts raising their forecast for Brent crude to $82.85 per barrel — up roughly 30 percent on earlier projections. The International Energy Agency estimated that the conflict reduced global crude oil supplies by around 11 million barrels per day through the end of March.
Major powers remain cautious about further escalation, acutely aware of the risks of military confrontation in a narrow and heavily trafficked corridor. The US military has said it sailed two warships through the strait in an effort to clear the waterway of Iranian mines, an announcement Iran denied.
Meanwhile, China — the largest importer of energy routed through Hormuz — has refrained from confrontation, preferring to use its diplomatic leverage with Tehran to secure passage for its own vessels.
As tensions persist, the Strait of Hormuz continues to test the balance between national interest and international law, with potentially far-reaching consequences for global trade and energy security.
Nigeria Watch
Why Abuja cannot afford to treat this as a distant crisis
For Nigeria, the Hormuz crisis is not a spectator sport. As Africa’s largest oil producer and a nation whose import bill — from refined petroleum to fertilisers — is denominated overwhelmingly in dollar freight costs shaped by global energy prices, the protracted closure of the world’s most critical oil corridor lands directly on the desks of policymakers in Abuja and operators at Apapa.
On the export side, Nigeria’s crude competes in a market where Asian buyers — who absorb the bulk of Gulf oil — are now scrambling to reconfigure supply chains. That scramble has kept Brent elevated, a short-term windfall for Nigeria’s federation account. But the Dangote Refinery’s ambitions to position Nigeria as a petroleum export hub for Africa depend on competitively priced crude feedstock and stable freight routes; sustained market volatility complicates that calculus.
On the import side, the shock is more acute. Nigeria still imports the majority of its cooking gas and industrial chemicals, significant volumes of which move through supply chains directly disrupted by the Hormuz closure. Fertiliser supply chains — of which up to 30 percent of internationally traded volumes normally transit the Strait of Hormuz (Wikipedia) — are already under strain, with downstream consequences for Nigeria’s agricultural input costs.
For NIMASA and the Federal Ministry of Marine and Blue Economy, the legal dimensions of the crisis deserve close study. If Iran succeeds in normalising transit fees on a natural international strait — even under the pressure of a peace deal brokered between Washington and Tehran — the precedent will not be lost on other coastal states bordering strategic waterways. Nigeria’s own positioning in the Gulf of Guinea, and its advocacy for regional maritime sovereignty within IMO frameworks, will eventually require a clear Nigerian position on whether geography confers the right to monetise global shipping corridors. The time to begin formulating that position is now.